Three data levers dominate the US markets in February: growth, labour and inflation. Beyond those, policy communication, trade headlines and geopolitics can still matter, even when they are not tied to a scheduled release date.

Growth: business activity and trade

Early to mid-month indicators provide a read on whether US momentum is stabilising or softening into Q1.

Key dates

• Advance monthly retail sales: 10 Feb, 8:30 am (ET) / 11 Feb, 12:30 am (AEDT) 
• Industrial Production and Capacity Utilisation: 18 Feb, 9:15 am (ET) / 19 Feb, 1:15 am (AEDT) 
• International Trade in Goods and Services: 19 Feb, 8:30 am (ET) / 20 Feb, 12:30 am (AEDT) 

What markets look for

Markets will be watching new orders and output trends in PMIs to gauge underlying demand momentum. Export and import data will offer insights into global trade flows and domestic consumption patterns. Traders will also assess whether manufacturing and services sectors remain in expansionary territory or show signs of contraction.

Market sensitivities

• Stronger growth can be associated with higher yields and a firmer USD, though inflation and policy expectations often dominate the rate response.
• Softer activity can be associated with lower yields and improved risk appetite, depending on inflation, positioning, and broader risk conditions.

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Payrolls data

Labour conditions remain a direct input into rate expectations. The monthly NFP report, alongside the weekly jobless claims released every Thursday, is typically watched for signs of cooling or renewed tightness.

Key dates

• Employment Situation (nonfarm payrolls, unemployment, wages): 6 Feb, 8:30 am (ET) / 7 Feb, 12:30 am (AEDT) 

What markets look for

Markets will focus on headline payrolls to assess the pace of job creation, the unemployment rate for signals of labour market slack, and average hourly earnings as a gauge of wage pressures. A gradual cooling can support the idea that wage pressures are easing. Persistent tightness may push out expectations for policy easing.

Market sensitivities

Payroll surprises frequently move Treasury yields and the USD quickly, with knock-on effects for equities and commodities.

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Inflation: CPI, PPI and PCE

Inflation releases remain a key input into expectations for the Fed’s policy path.

Key dates

• Consumer Price Index (CPI): 11 Feb, 8:30 am (ET) / 12 Feb, 12:30 am (AEDT) 
• Personal Income and Outlays, including the PCE price index): 20 Feb, 8:30 am (ET) / 21 Feb, 12:30 am (AEDT) 
• Producer Price Index (PPI): 27 Feb, 8:30 am (ET) / 28 Feb, 12:30 am (AEDT) 

What markets look for

Producer prices can act as a pipeline signal. CPI and the PCE price index can help confirm whether inflation pressures are broadening or fading at the consumer level.

How rates and the USD can react

• Cooling inflation can support lower yields and a softer USD, though market reactions can vary.
• Sticky inflation can keep upward pressure on yields and financial conditions, especially if it shifts policy expectations.

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Other influencing factors

Policy and communication

There is no scheduled February FOMC meeting, but speeches and other Fed communication, as well as the minutes cycle from prior meetings, can still influence expectations around the policy path.  Without a decision event, markets often react to shifts in tone, or renewed emphasis on inflation persistence and labour conditions.

Trade and geopolitics

Trade flows and energy markets can remain secondary, and the risk profile is typically headline-driven rather than linked to scheduled releases.

The Office of the United States Trade Representative has published fact sheets and policy updates (including on US-India trade engagement) that may occasionally influence sector and supply-chain sentiment at the margin, depending on the substance and market focus at the time. 

Separately, volatility tied to Middle East developments and any impact on energy pricing can filter into inflation expectations and bond yields. Weekly petroleum market data from the US Energy Information Administration is one input that markets often monitor for near-term signals.

今年初澳元作为商品货币受大宗商品价格上涨和通胀持续反弹造成了澳元大幅持续反弹。 通过昨日澳洲联储在货币政策新闻发布会的信息会对澳元的走势会造成什么影响？

1. 通胀判断：通胀明显回潮，风险在“根深蒂固”

澳洲联储认为，尽管通胀已较2022 年高点明显回落，但2025 年下半年通胀再度走强、动能过于强劲，仍将长期高于2–3% 目标区间中值，因此必须防止通胀失控并固化。

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2. 加息立场：这不是一次性动作，但会保持谨慎

澳洲联储此次一致通过加息25bp 至 3.85%，明确释放“加息未必止步于此”的信号，但同时强调将保持高度谨慎，不预设利率路径、不提供前瞻指引，且未考虑50bp 的激进加息。

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3. 经济背景：需求强、供给受限，是通胀再起的根源

澳洲联储指出，私人需求增长显著超预期，而产能受限与生产力疲软等结构性问题叠加政府支出强劲，导致在经济整体表现尚可的情况下，供给难以匹配需求并持续推高通胀压力。

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4. 劳动力与金融条件：仍偏紧，政策可能还不够“紧”

澳洲联储认为，在劳动力市场依然紧俏、工资和信贷增长走强的背景下，当前金融状况可能仍偏宽松，现金利率水平亦低于部分中性利率估计。

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5. 澳元角色：欢迎升值，视为政策传导工具

行长布洛克表示，澳元升值不仅是政策传导机制的一部分，还可在边际上收紧金融条件、降低进口通胀，助力联储控制通胀。

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6. 前景与市场含义：年内再加息概率显著上升

官方预测显示，假设利率按当前路径发展，年中将接近3.9%，年底可能升至4.10%–4.20%。

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7. 结论：

澳洲联储因通胀回升、私人需求强劲及产能受限而鹰派加息25bp至3.85%，暗示年内可能继续加息，澳元短线走强，市场对加息周期预期明显升温。

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For over 110 years, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) has operated at a deliberate distance from the White House and Congress.

It is the only federal agency that doesn’t report to any single branch of government in the way most agencies do, and can implement policy without waiting for political approval.

These policies include interest rate decisions, adjusting the money supply, emergency lending to banks, capital reserve requirements for banks, and determining which financial institutions require heightened oversight.

The Fed can act independently on all these critical economic decisions and more.

But why does the US government enable this? And why is it that nearly every major economy has adopted a similar model for their central bank?

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The foundation of Fed independence: the panic of 1907

The Fed was established in 1913 following the Panic of 1907, a major financial crisis. It saw major banks collapse, the stock market drop nearly 50%, and credit markets freeze across the country.

At the time, the US had no central authority to inject liquidity into the banking system during emergencies or to prevent cascading bank failures from toppling the entire economy. 

J.P. Morgan personally orchestrated a bailout using his own fortune, highlighting just how fragile the US financial system had become.

The debate that followed revealed that while the US clearly needed a central bank, politicians were objectively seen as poorly positioned to run it.

Previous attempts at central banking had failed partly due to political interference. Presidents and Congress had used monetary policy to serve short-term political goals rather than long-term economic stability.

So it was decided that a stand-alone body responsible for making all major economic decisions would be created. Essentially, the Fed was created because politicians, who face elections and public pressure, couldn’t be relied upon to make unpopular decisions when needed for the long-term economy.

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How does Fed independence work?

Although the Fed is designed to be an autonomous body, separate from political influence, it still has accountability to the US government (and thereby US voters). 

The President is responsible for appointing the Fed Chair and the seven Governors of the Federal Reserve Board, subject to confirmation by the Senate. 

Each Governor serves a 14-year term, and the Chair serves a four-year term. The Governors' terms are staggered to prevent any single administration from being able to change the entire board overnight.

Beyond this “main” board, there are twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks that operate across the country. Their presidents are appointed by private-sector boards and approved by the Fed's seven Governors. Five of these presidents vote on interest rates at any given time, alongside the seven Governors.

This creates a decentralised structure where no single person or political party can dictate monetary policy. Changing the Fed's direction requires consensus across multiple appointees from different administrations.

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The case for Fed independence: Nixon, Burns, and the inflation hangover

The strongest argument for keeping the Fed independent comes from Nixon’s time as president in the 1970s.

Nixon pressured Fed Chair Arthur Burns to keep interest rates low in the lead-up to the 1972 election. Burns complied, and Nixon won in a landslide. Over the next decade, unemployment and inflation both rose simultaneously (commonly referred to now as “stagflation”). 

By the late 1970s, inflation exceeded 13 per cent, Nixon was out of office, and it was time to appoint a new Fed chair.

That new Fed chair was Paul Volcker. And despite public and political pressure to bring down interest rates and reduce unemployment, he pushed the rate up to more than 19 per cent to try to break inflation. 

The decision triggered a brutal recession, with unemployment hitting nearly 11 per cent. 

But by the mid-1980s, inflation had dropped back into the low single digits. 

Volcker stood firm where non-independent politicians would have backflipped in the face of plummeting poll numbers.

The “Volcker era” is now taught as a masterclass in why central banks need independence. The painful medicine worked because the Fed could withstand political backlash that would have broken a less autonomous institution.

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Are other central banks independent? 

Nearly every major developed economy has an independent central bank. The European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, Bank of England, Bank of Canada, and Reserve Bank of Australia all operate with similar autonomy from their governments as the Fed.

However, there are examples of developed nations that have moved away from independent central banks.

In Turkey, the president forced its central bank to maintain low rates even as inflation soared past 85 per cent. The decision served short-term political goals while devastating the purchasing power of everyday people.

Argentina's recurring economic crises have been exacerbated by monetary policy subordinated to political needs. Venezuela's hyperinflation accelerated after the government asserted greater control over its central bank.

The pattern tends to show that the more control the government has over monetary policy, the more the economy leans toward instability and higher inflation.

Independent central banks may not be perfect, but they have historically outperformed the alternative.

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Why do markets care about Fed independence?

Markets generally prefer predictability, and independent central banks make more predictable decisions.

Fed officials often outline how they plan to adjust policy and what their preferred data points are. 

Currently, the Consumer Price Index (CPI), Personal Consumption Expenditures (PCE) index, Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) monthly jobs reports, and quarterly GDP releases form expectations about the future path of interest rates.

This transparency and predictability help businesses map out investments, banks to set lending rates, and everyday people to plan major financial decisions.

When political influence infiltrates these decisions, it introduces uncertainty. Instead of following predictable patterns based on publicly released data, interest rates can shift based on electoral considerations or political preference, which makes long-term planning more difficult.

The markets react to this uncertainty through stock price volatility, potential bond yield rises, and fluctuating currency values.

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The enduring logic

The independence of the Federal Reserve is about recognising that stable money and sustainable growth require institutions capable of making unpopular decisions when economic fundamentals demand them.

Elections will always create pressure for easier monetary conditions. Inflation will always tempt policymakers to delay painful adjustments. And the political calendar will never align perfectly with economic cycles. 

Fed independence exists to navigate these eternal tensions, not perfectly, but better than political control has managed throughout history.

That's why this principle, forged in financial panics and refined through successive crises, remains central to how modern economies function. And it's why debates about central bank independence, whenever they arise, touch something fundamental about how democracies can maintain long-term prosperity.